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Introduction:A New Perspective
On The Dependability Of Software Systems - Graham Button
Chapter 1: When a bed is not a bed: Calculation and Calculability
in Complex Organizational Settings - Karen Clarke, John Hughes, Mark Rouncefield,
Terry Hemmings
In this chapter we present instances of how organisational
knowledge is constructed, collected and used in a range of complex organisational
settings, including a large hospital trust in the North of England, a
steel production plant and a car manufacturer. Our main concern here is
to focus upon how representational artefacts of organisational activities
and 'states of play' are oriented to in the everyday work of staff in
these settings. For example, we focus on the situated character of the
representational artefact - a 'beds board'- and the system of calculability
that it affords in the hospital setting. Our view is that such representations
must be understood as embedded within the practicalities of the setting,
and that any assumed benefits of replacing existing systems must be carefully
considered.
Chapter 2: Enterprise modeling based on responsibility -
John Dobson with David Martin
Trust and responsibility are closely related concepts. If
I trust someone to do something, then I have implicitly given them a responsibility
to do it. failure to carry out such a responsibility is a breach of trust
- and trust, once broken, is not easy to repair. In the design of information
systems for use in organisations, it is important to establish the patterns
of trust and responsibility that exist in the organisation, since these
patterns tend to get inscribed in the system. It is a common enough observation
that information systems that do not match the patterns of trust and responsibility
in an organisation are not well received by their users. Making models
of these patterns is an important way for the system architect to reflect
them in the structure of the system, for where there are no models, there
is no understanding. So in describing one particular method of modelling
responsibilities in an organisation -a method that is one example of what
is generically called 'enterprise modelling'- we are providing the system
architect with a way of understanding, and therefore enabling to make
explicit, the implicit patterns of trust and responsibility that structure
all human organisations.
Chapter 3: Standardization, Trust and Dependability - Gillian
Hardstone, Luciana d'Adderio and Robin Williams
How is an information system made, or how does it become seen
as 'trustworthy' and hence dependable? And how trustworthy is the information
entered into that system? These questions become particularly acute where
users of a system are geographically distant from each other; or where
there is cognitive and substantive distance between their domains of knowledge;
or where the knowledge and practice of one community have not been fully
articulated, and are hence considered less significant or more remote
from the everyday concerns of another community. All these situations
raise socio-technical issues of trust, or its absence.
One answer suggested by the literature to the issues of dependability
highlighted above would appear to lie in a certain level of standardization
of information structures and organization practice in order to facilitate
control and co-ordination at a distance. However, our empirical material
illustrates that standardization intended to increase trust can itself
create or reveal system undependabilities, thereby compromising organizational
and professional trust and discretion. The questions then concern what
level or type of standardization may be deemed workable or desirable,
in order to create more dependable products, processes or systems. Since
local work groups (communities of practice) tend to articulate their own
systems of meaning, including information systems, around their particular
context, practices and purposes, does standardization imply or result
in the privileging of or support for some groups - and their ways of thinking,
doing and recording - over others. Does standardization force other groups
to align their practices with those embedded in standardized information
system procedures, or compel them to perform a continual translation process
between domains? This raises questions about the costs as well as the
benefits of standardization.
The chapter presents three case studies of moves towards standardization
within organizations: two from manufacturing industry (ComputerCo and
MotorCo) and one from public sector primary healthcare (NHS Urban). These
demonstrate different types and degrees of standardization, whether of
products, processes, practice and terminology, forms of knowledge or social
relations, to point up a variety of possible organizational approaches
and outcomes. Combining insights from the empirical material with sociological
studies of standardization we reflect upon the implications for the development
and implementation of more dependable computer-based systems. We conclude
that organizational processes of standardization are more negotiable than
formalist approaches assume. Conversely standardization processes are
not as open as many accounts that foreground the contingent nature of
local adaptation and translation processes suggest. We demonstrate that
in practice, levels and types of informational and operational standardization
vary widely between and within organizations, and can be related to organizational
control and co-ordination strategies.
Chapter 4: 'Its About Time': Temporal Features of Dependability
- Karen Clarke, John Hughes, Dave Martin, Mark Rouncefield, Ian Sommerville;
Alexander Vo, Rob Procter, Roger Slack and Mark Hartswood
This chapter uses our empirical studies on organisational
culture and trust to examine issues of timeliness as a feature of dependability.
It begins by considering some of the classical sociological approaches
to time and temporality such as Marx, Mauss, Simmel's work on time, trust
and expectation as well as (and in rather more detail) more recent treatments
of time such as Adam. Other recent accounts that impact on our work are
Garfinkel's notion of trust as the routine operation of background expectancies,
part of which relates to 'timeliness' and the work of Mumford (1963) on
temporal regularity and Zerubavel (1985) on temporal rhythms. In 'Technics
and Civilisation', Mumford (1963) suggests that "The first characteristic
of modern machine civilization is its temporal regularity" (Mumford
1963: 269) involving the structuring of social life by forcing activities
into fairly rigid temporal patterns. Mumford identifies four major forms
of temporal regularity - regular patterns of associating social events
and activities - rigid sequential structures, fixed durations, standard
temporal locations, and uniform rates of recurrence, stressing the fact
that these often constitute binding normative prescriptions. This notion
of recurrence of temporal patterns is also found in Zerubavel's (1985)
work on 'temporal rhythms in hospital settings: "The world in which
we live is a fairly structured place. Even the most casual glance at our
environment would already reveal a certain degree of orderliness. One
of the fundamental parameters of this orderliness is time - there are
numerous temporal patterns around us" (Zerubavel 1985: 1)
The relevance of rhythms in everyday working life is that
they orient members towards likely future activities and information needs
in the course of doing their work. Current activities are crafted with
an orientation towards expectations of future events. Although these rhythms
are a feature of the daily work they are not unchanging or unchangeable
but are affected by unexpected occurrences. As Dourish & Reddy (2002)
suggest, while work rhythms provide information to help people accomplish
their work and guide future activities, they can also pose challenges
to the coordination of work. "Medical practitioners must continually
balance and integrate medical and organizational information in decision-making;
that the processes of seeking and providing information are seamlessly
interwoven with other working activities; and that they are coordinated
in part through the set of working rhythms that provide a resource to
interpret and manage work". Different work rhythms can conflict with
each other - nurses and physicians for example that can produce different
expectations about the availability of information. Issues of timeliness
are pervasive in all aspects of the design and deployment of computer-based
systems The focus of this chapter is on issues of time and timeliness
as instantiated in our empirical studies of everyday work - how time is
woven into organisational culture. Our interest is in discovering and
demonstrating how temporal patterns - rhythms and trajectories - provide
individuals with a resource for seeking, providing, and managing information
in the course of their everyday work and the implications these findings
have for the design and deployment of dependable socio-technical systems.
Our empirical, ethnographic studies of organizational work
in DIRC have highlighted a number of facets of timeliness that we will
draw upon in our analysis. In our studies of road safety engineers, for
example, aspects of time - such as the time of day, the day of the week
and the month of the year were all seen as crucial in both understanding
and providing viable solutions to road traffic accidents. Our studies
of hospital work - staff handover, bed management and process modeling
and mapping - illustrate some of the timely features of patient admission,
treatment and discharge. In steelmaking and the rolling of steel plate
timeliness becomes a central feature of awareness and coordination of
the working division of labour. Finally, our studies of engine manufacture
highlight mundane issues of timeliness within 'just-in-time' production.
This enables us to conclude by reflecting on aspects of time and 'technomethodology'.
For if an aim of technomethodology was to make technology accountable
- able to provide an account of its behaviour; any such account must necessarily
include making technology take account of temporal aspects of human interaction
and work by building timeliness into the socio-technical system.
Chapter 5: Explicating Failure - Karen Clarke, Dave Martin,
Mark Rouncefield, Ian Sommerville; Alexander Voss, Corin Gurr, Rob
Procter, Roger Slack, Mark Hartswood
This chapter examines issues of 'failure' and organisational
culture by outlining and documenting some of the problems involved in
defining and measuring 'failure'. When defined as "the ability to
deliver service that can justifiably be trusted" - dependability
has a number of attributes. These include: availability (readiness for
correct service); reliability (continuity of correct service); safety
(absence of catastrophic consequences); integrity (absence of improper
system state alterations); maintainability (ability to undergo repairs)
and more. But as we consider broader, socio-technical, notions of "system",
the ability to achieve a clear and documented understanding of the intended
service of the system - and hence some view of dependability - becomes
increasingly difficult. Once we start taking into account the actual practice
of a socio-technical system rather than any idealisation of it, it seems
increasingly difficult to determine with sufficient precision what is
meant by the "service" the system offers. Thus it also becomes
difficult to determine what is meant by a "failure" of that
service, and thus what is meant by "dependability" in this broader
context.
In these circumstances we may need to broaden our understanding
of what dependability means beyond the simple "absence of failure",
particularly if we consider 'quality of service' to develop a more nuanced
notion of 'dependable systems'. As computer-based systems become more
complex and organisationally embedded, so the challenges of dependability
- of building systems involving complex interactions amongst computers
and humans - increase. In these systems, failure, or lack of dependability,
can result in financial or human loss and, consequently, improved means
of specifying, designing, assessing, deploying and maintaining complex
computer-based systems would seem of crucial importance. Much of the work
on dependability has necessarily, and naturally, focused on massive, extraordinary,
public failures such as the London Ambulance Service failure of 1992,
the space shuttle catastrophe of 1986, or the Ladbroke Grove train disaster
of 1999.
This chapter begins however, by being concerned with rather
more ordinary, everyday instances of dependability and failure. Instances
of undependability in many settings are not normally catastrophic, but
are rather mundane events that occasion situated practical (as opposed
to legal) inquiry and repair. Dependability can then be seen as being
the outcome of people's everyday, coordinated, practical actions. Workers
draw on more or less dependable artefacts and structures as a resources
for their work of achieving overall dependable results in the work they
are doing (Vo et al., 2002; Clarke et al., 2002).
Chapter 6: Patterns for dependable design - David Martin,
Mark Rouncefield and Ian Sommerville
Patterns of Cooperative Interaction are regularities in the
organisation of work, activity, and interaction. These patterns are organised
around a framework and are inspired by how such regularities are highlighted
in ethnomethodologically-informed ethnographic studies of work and technology.
They comprise a high level description and two or more comparable examples
drawn from specific studies. Our contention is that these patterns form
a useful resource for re-using findings from previous field studies for
enabling analysis and considering design in new settings. Previous work
on the relationship between ethnomethodology and design has been concerned
primarily in providing presentation frameworks and mechanisms, practical
advice, schematisations of the ethnomethodologist's role, different possibilities
of input at different stages in development, and various conceptualisations
of the relationship between study and design. In contrast, this paper
seeks to firstly discuss the position of patterns relative to emergent
major topics of interest of these studies. Subsequently it seeks to describe
the case for the collection of patterns based on findings, their comparison
across studies and their general implications for design problems, rather
than the concerns of practical and methodological interest outlined in
the other work. Special attention is paid to our evaluations and to how
they inform how the patterns collection may be read, used and contributed
to. The chapter finishes, with a discussion of how our Patterns relate
to organizational culture and dependability and trust.
Chapter 7: Dependability and Trust in Organizational and
Domestic Computer Systems - Ian Sommerville, Guy Dewsbury, Karen Clarke,
Mark Rouncefield
Organisational systems are designed for a specific purpose,
support known and defined processes and their use is controlled by the
organisation. In this context, when we consider the issue of what is meant
by a 'trusted' computer system, we argue that a technical view of trust
is appropriate. A system is trusted if it correctly provides the services
that it has been designed to deliver and is available for service when
required. Because both the operators and the computer system are within
the organisation then issues such as the provenance of the system are
disregarded in assessing its trustworthiness. Furthermore, as far as external
users of the system are concerned, their access is mediated by a human
operator so there is no direct trust relationship between the external
user and the computer system. Therefore, for systems that have a clear
role in organisational socio-technical processes, the primary trust relationship
is between the operator and the computer system and the dominant factor
in that trust is the dependability of the system. We discuss the notion
of dependability in the following section but, essentially, you can think
of it as an amalgam of other system properties such as system availability,
security, reliability, etc. More broadly, however, when we consider socio-technical
systems that are not entirely situated within an organisation then trust
is, of course, far more than a technical issue. It reflects the user's
confidence that the system will do what they want (whether or not this
has been specified by the system designers) and that it will not cause
damage that results in losses of time, information, money, etc. to the
user.
The degree of trust that an external user has in a system
depends on factors such as previous experience with comparable systems,
the provider's reputation, the existence of external sanctions on the
system provider if they fail to deliver services and the price paid. It
also reflects the degree of risk taken by the user in that people are
more willing to trust a system where the exposure to loss is relatively
low and legal factors such as the existence of regulators and compensation
bodies. In this chapter, we will not be concerned with these broader issues
of trust but, rather, will focus on trust from a technical perspective.
However, we will argue that, for systems where the use of defined operational
processes cannot be guaranteed or where users can choose whether or not
to use the system, there is a need to extend the technical view of dependability
to cover broader issues of fitness for purpose and adaptability as well
as more traditional properties such as system reliability and availability.
The remainder of the chapter therefore includes four principal
sections. Firstly, we discuss the currently accepted technical model of
system dependability as applied to organisational systems. We then go
on to critique this model and propose a broader model of system dependability
that incorporates this model but which extends it to be applicable to
domestic and discretionary systems - workplace systems where users have
a choice whether or not to make use of them. Finally, we propose ways
in which this model may be used in the design process for domestic and
discretionary systems.
Chapter 8: Understanding and Supporting Dependability as
Ordinary Action - Alexander Vo, Rob Procter, Roger Slack, Mark Hartswood
and Mark Rouncefield
In this chapter we are concerned with the ways in which people
within organisations experience dependability, how dependability is routinely
achieved through 'ordinary action', and what this could mean for the design,
development and implementation of dependable IT systems. Our programme
of investigation into these matters has a number of related threads, which
we will address in turn. First, we are interested in the in-vivo work
of living with systems that are more or less reliable and the practices
that this being 'more or less dependable' occasions. The situated practical
actions of living with systems (e.g., workarounds and so on) are important
to us in that they show how society membersi experience dependability
as a practical, day-to-day matter.
In particular, we seek to explicate what dependability means
in an everyday language sense, and to provide an analysis of the ways
in which systems come to be seen as dependable and the work members are
called upon to perform to make them more or less dependable. This is not
intended as a remedy or corrective to 'professional' uses of dependability,
but to demonstrate the value for IT professionals of looking at what,
following Livingston, we call the 'lived work' of working with more or
less dependable systems. By this we meaning attending to the 'what is
this?', 'what to do?' and 'what to do next?' of practical problem solving;
it draws our attention to the nature of candidate solutions and the fact
that not just anything will do.
To illustrate how dependability is realised in and as a part
of members' ordinary actions - the 'routine' but nevertheless skilful
responses to both expected and unexpected problems - we draw on material
from an ethnographic study of control room work and IT systems implementation
in a manufacturing plant. Instances of undependability in this setting
are quite frequentbut are not normally catastrophic. Rather, they are
'normal, natural troubles' that occasion situated, practical investigation
and repair. This is in contrast to much of the extant literature, which
has focused on dependability issues as fatal issues, e.g., studies of
such cases as the London Ambulance Service or Therac-25. The first part
of our study points to some of the worldly contingencies of production
management that control room workers routinely deal with as a part of
their work.
In particular, we show how the practical implementation of
a production plan is a production worker's formulation, produced in response
to issues concerning the 'local logics' of day-to-day production management.
By this we mean to emphasise the dynamic yet situated nature of knowledge
and plans, the 'minor actions, minor decisions and minor changes'í
upon which the organisation rides. Our findings lead us to support the
argument that the implementation of plans is always a practical and situated
activity, the character of which emerges in action. This view emphasises
the incompleteness of knowledge and the set of circumstances - more or
less intended, arbitrary, uncontrolled or unanticipated - which affect
action. In the second part of our study, having looked at the use of IT
systems and related practices in the control room, we turn to the implementation
of these systems and their configuration in what constitutes the socio-material
basis for production work. Here, the day-to-day activities of the plant's
own IT staff come to the fore.
The case study material shows how their work is closely related
to production work and how dependability of the overall production process
is a concern shared by IT and non-IT professionals in the plant. As in
the case of the control room workers, one might say that the activities
of the plant's IT staff are situated and that for them, too, dependability
is a contexted matter. We conclude by considering how the understanding
gained from witnessing at first hand members' experience of dependability
as a practical, day-to-day matter might be taken up and applied more widely
to the design, development and implementation of dependable IT systems.
In particular, we point to the problem of the 'design fallacy', the assumption
that more dependable IT systems can be achieved by more sophisticated
processes of a priori requirements analysis and design. Instead, we propose
co-realisation as an approach to building highly dependable, work affording
artefacts, which is based upon creating a shared practice between IT professionals
and system users that is set within the context of use [7].
Chapter 9: The DIRC project as the context of this book -
Cliff B Jones
This and the related notion of membership point to the skills
people have, what they know and do competently in a particular setting.
In this usage we also stress mundane, banal competence as opposed to professionalised
conduct.
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